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Cocaine abuse remains a major U.S. public health problem. The number of
frequent cocaine users (those who use once or more per week) remains stable
at 500,000-750,000 individuals (SubstanceAbuse and Mental Health Services
Administration 1996a), as many as half or more ofnewly arrested felons test
positive for recent cocaine use (National Institute ofJustice 1996), and demand
for treatment for cocaine abuse is increasing (NationalAssociation ofStateAl-
cohol and DrugAbuse Directors 1996), as is the frequency ofemergency room
visits for cocaine-related problems (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Ser-
vices Administration 1996b). While there is progress in the development of
effective treatments for cocaine abuse, high rates ofearly attrition and contin-
ued drug use remain common (Higgins and Wong 1998), leaving no question
about the need for additional and more-effective treatment interventions. Also
importantto keep in mind is that the majority ofcocaine and otherdrug abusers
are notenrolled in formal substance abuse treatment (Regieret al. 1993). Thus,
strategies are needed for reducing cocaine abuse in other settings. Lastly, as in
other areas ofpublic health, prevention ofcocaine abuse is preferable to having
to treat the problem after it has emerged. There ~s a tremendous need for effec-
tive strategies to prevent cocaine abuse (Institute ofMedicine 1996).
The purpose of this report is to discuss some potential implications that I
see in reinforcement and consumer-demand theory for the development ofef-
fective strategies for reducing cocaine abuse.
Stephen T. Higgins is professor ofpsychiatry and psychology at the University ofVermont.
Preparation of this chapter was supported by R01DA08076 and R01DA09378 and General
Clinical Research CenterAward RR-109 from the National Institutes ofHealth.
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6.1 Applying Reinforcement and Consumer-Demand
Theory to the Study ofCocaine Abuse
An impressive degree of consensus exists within the scientific community
that cocaine abuse is engendered, in part, by the drug's ability to act as a potent
positive reinforcer in much the way that food, water, and sex act in that manner
(Johanson and Schuster 1995). The reinforcing effect ofcocaine is not unique
to humans; it has been demonstrated in a wide variety ofotherwise normal lab-
oratory animals. Neither physical dependence nor even a prior history of co-
caine exposure are necessary for cocaine to function as a reinforcer. Effects of
alterations in cocaine dose, schedule of availability, and other environmental
manipulations are orderly and have generality across different species (Johan-
son and Fischman 1989; Johanson and Schuster 1995). These commonalities
across species support a theoretical position that cocaine produces use and
abuse via basic, normal processes ofconditioning.
Understanding that reinforcement and other basic aspects of conditioning
are involved in the genesis and maintenance ofcocaine abuse is important be-
cause it means that information from the larger conditioning literature poten-
tially can be brought to bearon improving ourunderstanding ofcocaine abuse.
The application ofconsumer-demand theory to the study ofreinforcement, an
area of investigation known as behavioral economics, is one example where
concepts and principles from the larger conditioning literature have been suc-
cessfully applied to the study ofcocaine and otherforms ofdrug abuse. Behav-
ioral economics has been applied to a relatively broad range of topics in the
areaofsubstanceabuse, rangingfromcarefullycontrolledexperimentswithlab-
oratory animals to discussions ofpolicy (e.g., Bickel et al. 1990, 1993, 1995;
Bickel and DeGrandpre 1996a; Vuchinich and Tucker 1988). In this report,
the economic concepts of demand, price, opportunity cost, and commodity
interactions (i.e., substitution, complementarity, and independence) are uti-
lized to illustrate how I believe behavioral economics can contribute to efforts
to reduce cocaine abuse. Demand is used to refer to cocaine seeking and use.
Price is used to refer to the amount ofresources expended in acquiring, using,
and recovering from the effects of cocaine consumption. Opportunity cost is
used to refer to opportunities to consume other reinforcers that are forfeited
via cocaine consumption. The concepts of substitution, complementarity, and
independence are used to refer to the manner in which other reinforcers inter-
act with cocaine. (See Bickel et al. 1993 for a more detailed discussion ofthese
terms and concepts.)
Laboratory studies illustrating the application of these concepts to cocaine
use by nonhuman and human subjects are discussed first. Next, several treat-
ment outcome studies are described to illustrate the applicability ofthese con-
cepts to clinical populations and settings. Lastly, implications ofthese concepts
for efforts to reduce use cocaine use via interventions applied in settings other
than formal substance abuse clinics are discussed. A final point before turning
to a discussion ofempirical studies is that the focus ofthis report is on efforts159 Applying Behavioral Economics to Reducing Cocaine Abuse
to reduce cocaine demand. I recognize that supply and demand are integrally
related, but discussing both is not possible within the constraints ofthis manu-
script. Readers interested in a discussion ofthe implications ofbehavioral eco-
nomics for policy and other matters regarding drug supply should see Bickel
and DeGrandpre (1996a, 1996b).
6.2 Laboratory Settings
6.2.1 Studies with Laboratory Animals
Results from a study by Nader and Woolverton (1992) conducted with
three food-deprived rhesus monkeys illustrate nicely cocaine's reinforcing ef-
fects and how those effects are dependent on economic context. Subjects were
fitted with venous catheters to permit drug infusions and resided in chambers
equipped with two response levers. Responding on one of the levers resulted
in the delivery offood or infusions ofvarying doses ofcocaine, depending on
the color ofthe associated stimulus lights. Responding on the other lever per-
mitted subjects to alternate between the stimulus lights paired with cocaine or
food availability (i.e., monkeys controlled which commodity they worked for).
The number ofresponses necessary to obtain food remained at 30 throughout
the experiment. The cocaine option was varied in two ways. First, the number
of responses needed to obtain an intravenous infusion of cocaine (i.e., price)
was varied from a minimum of 30 up to a maximum of480 or 960 responses
depending on the particular monkey. Second, a range ofdrug doses was exam-
ined at each cocaine price.
All three monkeys self-administered cocaine, and choice ofthe drug option
increased as an orderly function of increasing drug dose (fig. 6.1). Note that
at the two lowest prices (represented by circles and squares), intermediate
doses ofcocaine were sufficient to get all three monkeys to almost exclusively
choose cocaine over food. That these food-deprived monkeys would volun-
tarily forgo food for cocaine illustrates the potent reinforcing effects of this
drug. Note also, however, that cocaine choice was decreased below 50 percent
in all three monkeys by increasing the price per cocaine infusion to 480 or960
responses (represented by open and closed triangles). This latter observation
illustrates how cocaine's reinforcing effects are dependent on economic con-
text.
A study by Carroll, Lac, and Nygaard (1989) conducted with rats illustrates
cocaine's reinforcing effects and how those effects are dependent on the pres-
ence or absence ofa substitute for cocaine. A total of55 rats participated and
were divided into 11 experimental groups. All subjects were fitted with venous
catheters. During 15 24-hour sessions, the various groups had continuous, con-
current access to intravenous infusions of either cocaine or saline via lever
pressing and to either a glucose-plus-saccharin solution or water via tongue-
operated drinking devices. Unlike in the Nader and Woolverton study, there
were no experimenter-determined limits on the number of choices subjects160 Stephen T. Higgins
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Fig.6.1 Cocaine versus food
Source: Nader and Woolverton (1992).
Note: Percentages oftrials in which cocaine was chosen are shown as a function ofcocaine dose;
data are shown as individual-subject plots and group means. The alternative to cocaine was one
food pellet available under a fixed-ratio (FR) 30 schedule. Cocaine was available under different
FR values, which are represented by the different symbols (open circles, FR 30; open squares, FR
120; open triangles, FR 480; closed triangle, FR 960). Each point is the average ofthe last three
sessions ofa condition. Vertical lines in the group data represent 1 SEM.
could make between the two options, and choices were not exclusive. Addi-
tionally, subjects were not trained to self-administer cocaine prior to these ses-
sions, which provided an opportunity to examine how the presence ofa substi-
tute affects the initiation ofcocaine use.
As expected, infusion rates were significantly higher in rats given access to
cocaine compared to controls given access to saline, demonstrating the re-
inforcing effects of cocaine. However, the sensitivity of cocaine use to the
presence of a substitute was also demonstrated. Substitution of water for the
glucose-plus-saccharin solution in rats initially exposed to concurrent cocaine
and glucose-plus-saccharin availability produced nearly a twofold increase in
cocaine self-administration. There was no change in saline self-administration
in a control group exposed to the same changes in drinking solutions. Thus,
rates of cocaine self-administration when the glucose-plus-saccharin solution
was present were substantially below maximal levels; that is, the glucose-plus-
saccharin solution effectively substituted for cocaine. Similarly, replacing wa-
ter with the glucose-plus-saccharin solution in rats that were initially exposed
to concurrent cocaine and water availability decreased cocaine self-admini-
stration. Again, there was no change in the rate ofsaline infusions in a control161 Applying Behavioral Economics to Reducing Cocaine Abuse
group that experienced the same changes in drinking solutions. So, consistent
with the findings of Nader and Woolverton, these results demonstrated co-
caine's potent reinforcing effects and also the malleability ofthose effects de-
pendent on economic context.
Another point of interest in the Carroll et al. report is that the magnitude
ofthe increase in cocaine self-administration that resulted from replacing the
glucose-plus-saccharin solution with water was substantially larger than the
decreases in drug ingestion that resulted from replacing water with the
glucose-plus-saccharin solution. Put differently, the ability of glucose-plus-
saccharin to substitute for cocaine was greater during the initiation ofcocaine-
reinforced responding than it was once cocaine use was established. The meth-
odological difference between the Carroll et al. and Nader and Woolverton
studies noted above likely contributed to this differential effect ofthe glucose-
plus-saccharin solution. Unlike in the Nader and Woolverton studies, choices
between drug and food were not exclusive in this study; that is, there were no
contingencies arranged in the Carroll et al. study requiring that subjects forgo
cocaine in order to obtain the alternative. A plausible hypothesis is that simply
enriching an environmentin which cocaine is available by introducing nondrug
substitutes without any explicit contingencies between their availability and
drug use may more effectively interfere with the initiation ofcocaine use than
with a well-established pattern ofcocaine self-administration.
A study by Carroll and Lac (1993) further illustrates the ability ofa substi-
tute reinforcer to interfere with the initiation ofcocaine use. Four groups of12
rats each were studied; a fifth group was studied as well, but is not directly
germane to the present discussion. In a two-by-two experimental design, the
four groups were exposed to glucose-plus-saccharin or water for three weeks
prior to and then during 30 cocaine self-administration initiation sessions. An
initiation criterion was established to determine whether cocaine self-admini-
stration was initiated during the 30-day acquisition period: Subjects had to
achieve an average of 100 or more drug ingestions per session across five con-
secutive six-hour sessions. The group that had access to the glucose-plus-
saccharin solution before and during initiation sessions had the greatest num-
ber offailures to initiate regular self-administration (50 percent), followed by
the group with glucose-plus-saccharin during initiation sessions only (25 per-
cent), and the two groups with water available during initiation sessions had
no failures (0 percent) (fig. 6.2).
Interestingly, this same group of investigators failed to significantly influ-
ence self-administration in monkeys smoking cocaine (Comer, Hunt, and Car-
roll 1994). In that study, a saccharin solution was introduced after cocaine self-
administration was already established. While this manipulation decreased co-
caine's behavioral control to a limited extent in several subjects, the effects
were relatively unimpressive. No doubt many differences between this study
and others discussed in this report make comparisons difficult. Those differ-
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Fig.6.2 Acquisition ofcocaine self-administration
Source: Carroll and Lac (1993).
Note: Frequency distributions are presented for groups 1-4. The number ofdays until the acquisi-
tion criterion was met is divided into five, five-day intervals, and the number ofrats that acquired
within each interval is represented by the height ofeach bar. No rats met the criterion between 26
and 30 days. The last column depicts the number ofrats that did not meet the criterion within the
30 days allotted. The two upper panels show the two groups that received access to glucose-plus-
saccharin in the operant chamber, and the two lower panels indicate that only water was available
in the operant chamber. The left panels show the two groups that were exposed to glucose-plus-
saccharin in the home cage, while the right panels show the groups exposed to only water in the
home cage.
tially reducing cocaine self-administration once it is already well established
may require an arrangement in which access to the other commodity is made
contingent on forgoing the cocaine option. Such additional contingencies ap-
pear unnecessary to significantly interfere with the initiation ofcocaine use.
6.2.2 Studies with Humans
A study by Higgins, Bickel, and Hughes (1994) illustrates the application of
these concepts to human cocaine users responding under controlled laboratory163 Applying Behavioral Economics to Reducing Cocaine Abuse
conditions. Subjects were four healthy individuals who did notmeet diagnostic
criteria for cocaine orany other form ofdrug dependence (except nicotine) but
were recent, occasional users of cocaine. Drug was administered intranasally
in 10 mg unit doses of cocaine hydrochloride or a placebo consisting of ap-
proximately 0.4 mg cocaine and 9.6 mg lactose. The maximum dose ofcocaine
allowed per session was 100 mg, which is a psychoactive dose. Subjects sam-
pled cocaine and placebo under double-blind conditions in two separate ses-
sions, with the compounds labeled drug A and drug B. During a third session,
they made a maximum of 10 exclusive choices between drugs A and B.
Choices were registered by completion of a fixed-ratio (FR) 10 schedule on
either of two concurrently available levers associated with drug and placebo
options. Subjects could also forgo either option. Session duration was a maxi-
mum oftwo hours. Subjects had to choose cocaine over the placebo seven or
more times during that double-blind cocaine-versus-placebo choice session in
order to participate in the subsequent cocaine-versus-money sessions. Subjects
were not informed of that criterion. The reason for the criterion was that we
wanted to study subjects for whom cocaine functioned as a reinforcer, since
that is a central feature ofcocaine abuse. Cocaine-versus-money sessions were
structured like the cocaine-versus-placebo session, except that now subjects
chose between cocaine and varying amounts ofmoney. Subjects were informed
of monetary values prior to each cocaine-versus-money session, and values
were varied across each session. Values varied from zero to $2.00 per choice
or, in total sums, from zero to $20.00 per session. Payment occurred immedi-
ately after each session.
All four subjects exclusively chose cocaine over the placebo, demonstrat-
ing that the drug functioned as a reinforcer and satisfying the eligibility crite-
rion for participation in the second phase of the experiment. During sessions
comparing cocaine and money, choice ofcocaine decreased as the amount of
money available in the monetary option increased, with all subjects exclusively
choosing the monetary option in the $2.00 per choice condition (fig. 6.3). In
economic terms, choice ofcocaine decreased as opportunity cost (i.e., amount
ofmoney forfeited) increased.
A second study following the same procedures as outlined above further
illustrates these points (Higgins, Roll, and Bickel 1996). Subjects were 11 vol-
unteers with the same characteristics as those described in the previous discus-
sion. Nine of the 11 subjects reliably chose cocaine over the placebo in the
choice session, demonstrating that the drug functioned as a reinforcer and es-
tablishing their eligibility for the cocaine-versus-money sessions. Two subjects
who did not meet the eligibility criterion and two additional subjects who had
scheduling conflicts were excluded from the cocaine-versus-money sessions.
Again, cocaine preference decreased as an orderly function ofopportunity cost
(fig. 6.4). However, this study had an additional feature that distinguished it
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Fig. 6.3 Cocaine versus money
Source: Higgins, Bickel, and Hughes (1994).
Note: Number of cocaine choices are plotted as a function of the value of money available per
choice in the monetary option. Subjects made a maximum of 10 choices between cocaine and
money during each session. Data are presented for each of the four individual subjects and as a
group average. Results from the first and second exposures to the different monetary values are
shown separately.
were treated with varying doses of alcohol (placebo, 0.5, and 1.0 g/kg). Pre-
treatment with the active doses of alcohol increased preference for cocaine
over the monetary reinforcer, with that effect being most discernible in the
high money condition. In economic terms, alcohol and cocaine functioned as
complements; that is, as consumption of alcohol increased, so too did con-
sumption ofcocaine. Note that, on average, alcohol pretreatment did not elimi-
nate sensitivity to opportunity cost (it did in some individuals), but it modu-
lated that relationship.165 Applying Behavioral Economics to Reducing Cocaine Abuse
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Fig. 6.4 Cocaine versus money: Effects ofalcohol
Source: Higgins, Roll, and Bickel (1996).
Note: Number of cocaine choices during sessions involving alcohol pretreatment are shown as a
function ofthree money conditions (low [L], medium [M], and high [H] monetary values), with
separate functions presented for each ofthe three alcohol doses (placebo [PL], 0.5 g/kg, 1.0 g/kg).
All data points represent means from seven subjects who completed the experiment; brackets
represent ± SEM.
6.3 Clinical Applications: Contingency Management
Contingency-management interventions are commonly used in the treat-
ment ofillicit-drug abuse (Stitzer and Higgins 1995), and can be conceptual-
ized as interventions that directly and systematically increase the opportunity
cost ofdrug use (cf. Bickel et al. 1993). That is, conditions are arranged such
that drug use results in the forfeiture ofan alternative reinforcer. In that sense,
the price ofingesting cocaine oranother drug is the usual price associated with
its acquisition and consumption plus the forfeiture ofthe reinforcer that would
have been available had the individual abstained (Le., opportunity cost). I am
aware of 13 controlled trials examining the efficacy ofdifferent contingency-
management interventions for reducing cocaine use, either alone or as a part
of multi-element treatment packages (Higgins 1996). Significant treatment
effects supporting the efficacy of the interventions in reducing cocaine use
were observed in 11 (85 percent) ofthose 13 trials. No other type oftreatment
intervention has a comparable level ofempirical support for its efficacy in re-
ducing cocaine abuse. Considered together, these studies provide compelling
evidenceforthesensitivityofcocaineuseinclinicalpopulationstocontingency-166 Stephen T. Higgins
management interventions, or, in economic terms, opportunity cost. Two stud-
ies are described for illustrative purposes.
The first study was conducted with 40 cocaine-dependent adults who were
randomly assigned to behavioral treatment with or without an added incentive
program (Higgins et al. 1994). Subjects in the group with incentives earned
points recorded on vouchers that were exchangeable for retail items when
thrice-weekly urine-toxicology screens indicated cocaine abstinence. Subjects
assigned to the no-incentives group received slips ofpaperafter each urinalysis
screen, but those vouchers had no monetary value. All other aspects of the
treatment were identical for the two groups. Subjects in both groups received
counseling based on the Community ReinforcementApproach (CRA). Vouch-
ers were discontinued after week 12 ofthe 24-week treatment program. In eco-
nomic terms, the opportunity cost associated with cocaine use was increased
for 12 weeks in the incentive group, but remained unchanged in the no-
incentive group.
Approximately twofold longer durations of continuous cocaine abstinence
were documented in the incentive group during the 24-week treatment period
than in the no-incentive group (means were 11.7 ± 2.0 weeks in incentive
group versus 6.0 ± 1.5 in the no-incentive group; see fig. 6.5). Additionally,
those assigned to the incentive group evidenced greater reductions in the Ad-
diction Severity Index (ASI) Composite Drug Scale one year after treatment
entry (nine months after cessation ofvouchers) compared to those assigned to
the no-incentive group (Higgins et al. 1995). This difference was largely due
to three items: (i) the mean number ofdays ofcocaine use in the past 30 days
decreased from 11.0 ± 1.3 at baseline to 0.9 ± 1.4 at one-year follow-up in
the incentive group, versus 8.8 ± 1.3 to 2.3 ± 1.3 in the no-incentive group;
(ii) the mean number ofdays in the past 30 days on which patients experienced
drug problems decreased from 15.7 ± 1.9 at baseline to 1.8 ± 2.3 at one-year
follow-up in the incentive group, versus 9.1 ± 1.9 to 6.1 ± 2.2 in the no-
incentive group; and (iii) how troubled orbothered patients were in the past 30
days by these drug problems (rated from 0 to 4, with higher scores indicating
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Fig. 6.5 Continuous cocaine abstinence
Source: Higgins et al. (1994).
Note: Mean durations of continuous abstinence achieved in each treatment group during weeks
1-24 (left panel), 1-12 (center panel), and 13-24 (right panel). Solid bars represent the incentive
group and open bars the no-incentive group.167 Applying Behavioral Economics to Reducing Cocaine Abuse
more problems) decreased from 3.6 ± 0.3 at baseline to 0.9 ± 0.3 at one-year
follow-up in the incentive group, versus 3.3 ± 0.2 to 1.6 ± 0.3 in the no-
incentive group.
The other study illustrating the sensitivity ofcocaine use to opportunity cost
in clinical populations was conducted in a methadone-maintenance clinic lo-
cated in Baltimore, Maryland (Silverman et al. 1996). Subjects were 37 intra-
venous cocaine abusers enrolled in outpatient methadone-maintenance treat-
ment for opioid dependence. Subjects were selected for the study after being
identified as regular abusers of cocaine via urinalysis monitoring. Patients
were randomized to routine methadone counseling plus contingent incentives
or the same counseling plus noncontingent incentives. The contingent incen-
tives were vouchers exchangeable for retail items delivered for 12 weeks just
as in the study described previously. In contrast to the prior study, however,
subjects assigned to the control group in this study also received vouchers,
but they were delivered independent of urinalysis results and according to a
schedule that was yoked to the contingent group (i.e., a noncontingent control
group). Note that the manner in which alternative reinforcers were made avail-
able in this control group mimics in some importantrespects the methods used
by Carroll and colleagues; that is, the alternatives were available independent
ofwhether subjects self-administered cocaine.
Subjects who received contingent vouchers achieved significantly greater
durations of continuous cocaine abstinence (fig. 6.6) than those assigned to
the control group, further illustrating the effects ofopportunity cost in clinical
populations ofcocaine abusers. The control group evidenced little discernible
benefit from the alternative reinforcers in terms ofreducing their cocaine use.
The failure of the vouchers to substantially reduce cocaine use in the control
group suggests that the reductions observed in the contingent group were due
to increases in opportunity cost and not substitution per see Ifsubstitution was
the important variable, effects should have been comparable across the two
groups.
Consistent with the laboratory study on alcohol and cocaine described
above, the ability ofcontingent vouchers to decrease cocaine use appears to be
modulated by alcohol use. This point is illustrated by the results from a chart
review conducted with 16 individuals who met diagnostic criteria for cocaine
dependence and alcohol abuse/dependence (Higgins et al. 1993). All subjects
were treated with contingent vouchers and CRA. Disulfiram therapy for alco-
hol abuse/dependence is a routine component of CRA. Disulfiram interferes
with alcohol metabolism such that an unpleasant physical reaction usually oc-
curs if one consumes alcohol while taking the medication. Subjects were in-
cluded in the chart review on the basis of having two or more weeks on and
offdisulfiram therapy during their current treatment episode, which permitted
an opportunity to assess for associated benefits. Subjects reported an average
of0.05 ± 0.02 drinking days weekly while taking disulfiram versus 1.5 ± 0.4


































Fig. 6.6 Continuous cocaine abstinence
Source: Silverman et al. (1996).
Note: Longest duration of continuous cocaine abstinence achieved during the 12-week voucher
condition. Each point represents data for an individual patient, and the lines represent group
means. The 19 abstinence-reinforcement patients are displayed in the left column, and the 18
control patients in the right.
while taking disulfiram was 4.7 ± 2.2, versus 10.9 ± 2.6 offofthe medication.
Changes on both ofthose drinking measures were statistically significant and
expected based on what is known scientifically about disulfiram therapy. What
was unexpected was that disulfiram therapy was associated with significant
reductions in cocaine use. The percentage ofcocaine-positive specimens while
taking disulfiram was 11 percent ± 3 versus 25 percent ± 6 offofthe medica-
tion, a statistically significant difference. In economic terms, cocaine and alco-
hol appeared to act as complements. That is, when subjects were offofdisul-
firam and drank more frequently, cocaine use also increased, and when they
were on disulfiram and drank less frequently, cocaine use decreased (Le., com-
plementary relationship).
6.4 Applications beyond the DrugAbuse Treatment Clinic
As was noted above, the majority ofcocaine abusers are not enrolled in for-
mal substance abuse treatment. Thus, there is a need to devise strategies for
reducing cocaine abuse in other settings. Thatraises the question ofwhat addi-
tional evidence exists that cocaine use in naturalistic settings is sensitive to the
economic factors under discussion in this report.169 Applying Behavioral Economics to Reducing Cocaine Abuse
Several recent reports based on data from large epidemiological studies sup-
port the sensitivity of cocaine use in naturalistic settings to price. Grossman
and Chaloupka (1998) studied results from the Monitoring the Future survey,
which is conducted annually with a nationally representative sample of high
school seniors. A sample of approximately 2,400 individuals in each class is
chosen for follow-up, with halfofthem being followed on even years and the
others on odd years. Grossman and Chaloupka used results from 10 consecu-
tive years offollow-up data. Cocaine use was analyzed in terms offrequency
of use among those who were already users at baseline, and participation in
cocaine use from one follow-up to the next. These two measures of cocaine
use were analyzed in relation to cocaine price, which was estimated for the
different geographical residences of the survey participants using the System
to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE), a database ofcocaine
prices throughout the United States maintained by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA). Statistically significant and negative relationships were ob-
served between cocaine price and both measures of cocaine use (i.e., greater
price meant less use).
Another study by Saffer and Chaloupka (1997) assessed sensitivity of co-
caine use to price using data collected from over 49,000 participants in the
National Household Surveys conducted in 1988, 1990, and 1991. The National
Household Survey provides information on the use ofillicit drugs, alcohol, and
tobacco among members of the civilian, noninstitutionalized U.S. population
age 12 and older. Saffer and Chaloupka assessed participation in cocaine use
as a function of cocaine price, with the latter being estimated based on the
STRIDE database. Relationships between cocaine use and price were negative
and statistically significant. It merits mention that this study also provided evi-
dence that alcohol and cocaine function as complements, consistent with the
results from the laboratory and clinic studies described earlier.
Considering that we know that cocaine use is sensitive to price and other
economic factors in laboratory, clinic, and general population studies, it does
not seem too large a stretch to speculate about additional ways in which eco-
nomic factors might be manipulated to reduce cocaine use and abuse in set-
tings other than substance abuse treatment clinics. In the paragraphs that fol-
low I discuss three examples ofhow these principles might be applied.
First, attempts could be made to intervene in neighborhoods that are at risk
for fostering the initiation ofcocaine use and abuse (Crum, Lillie-Blanton, and
Anthony 1996; Lillie-Blanton, Anthony, and Schuster 1993). A recent study
by Crum et al. (1996) provides a nice illustration of the potential impact of
neighborhoods on the initiation ofcocaine use. Self-reported data on opportu-
nities to use cocaine and otherdrugs were collectedfrom 1,416 urban-dwelling
middle-school participants in a longitudinal field study. The neighborhoods in
which these children resided were rated using an 18-item scale that assessed
safety (e.g., safe places to walk), neglect (e.g., broken bottles, trash around),
and other neighborhood characteristics. Scale scores were used to categorize170 Stephen T. Higgins
neighborhoods into most, middle, and least disadvantaged. After controlling
for grade, gender, minority status, and peer drug use, children residing in the
most disadvantaged neighborhoods were estimated to be 5.6 times more likely
to have been offered the opportunity to use cocaine than those living in rela-
tively advantaged neighborhoods.
Such at-risk neighborhoods could be targeted for programs strategically de-
signed and scheduled to increase the availability ofhealthy and effective sub-
stitutes for cocaine use. Programs in the arts and music, athletics, academics,
social relations, and careerdevelopment are examples ofthe kinds ofprograms
that might be investigated. The content, scheduling, and location ofthese pro-
grams would have to be carefully planned to substitute for the social, entertain-
ment, and other functions that are often served by cocaine use. Well-conducted
basic-science research studies have demonstrated the efficacy of alternative,
nondrug substitutes for disrupting the initiation ofcocaine use (Carroll, et al.
1989; Carroll and Lac 1993). They can do so in the absence of any explicit
contingencies between cocaine use and access to the substitute. The fact that
such contingencies are unnecessary is important because it means that the ef-
ficacy of such interventions need not depend on objective monitoring of co-
caine use (e.g., urinalysis), which is costly and impractical for prevention ef-
forts. Whether disruptions in the initiation ofcocaine use comparable to those
observed in the laboratory could be caused by systematically programming
substitutes for cocaine use in at-risk neighborhoods is an important question
that warrants scientific investigation. Such interventions have the potential to
contribute to the targeted, theoretically based community interventions that
have been called for in prevention research (Institute ofMedicine 1996).
Second, cocaine abuse is prevalent at alarming levels in newly arrested and
othercriminal offenders. Itis not uncommon for halformore ofnewly arrested
felons to test positive for recent cocaine use (National Institute of Justice
1996). These individuals contribute directly to the high U.S. incarcerationrates
and attendant escalating criminaljusticecosts. A plausible alternative for cases
involving nonviolent crimes related to cocaine use are programs similar to the
voucher program described earlier. However, instead ofvouchers, individuals
in these programs might earn progressively greater reductions in their level of
criminaljustice supervision by continuously abstaining from cocaine. Cocaine
use would set supervision back to a stricter level. Important features of such
programs would be regular and sensitive monitoring so that cocaine use is
readily detected, consistent consequences for drug use and abstinence deliv-
ered with minimal delay, and consequences set at an intensity and duration that
permit clients to interact repeatedly with the contingencies so that they may
contact and learn from the new opportunity costs ofcontinuing to use cocaine.
Many states currently have programs that approximate this suggestion, butthey
generally lack the important contingency-management features just men-
tioned. I know ofno controlled trials examining the efficacy ofany such pro-
gram in reducing cocaine use among criminal offenders, but such studies cer-171 Applying Behavioral Economics to Reducing Cocaine Abuse
tainly appear warranted. Considering the relatively robust evidence supporting
the sensitivity ofcocaine use to opportunity cost and other economic factors,
such programs seem to offer a reasonable and cost-effective alternative to cur-
rent practices.
Third, cocaine and other drug abuse is a serious problem among a subset of
individuals receiving Veterans and Social Security Insurance disability income
(Satel 1995). A recent study examining the relationship between cocaine use
and disability payments among schizophrenics provides an interesting example
(Shaner et al. 1995). The severity of psychiatric symptoms, hospitalization
rates, and cocaine urine toxicology screens were assessed for 15 consecutive
weeks in 105 veterans who met diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia and co-
caine dependence. On average, these individuals reported spending half of
their total income on illegal drugs. Cocaine use, psychiatric symptoms, and
hospital admissions peaked during the first or second weekofthe month, coin-
cident with delivery ofthe disability payment. Citing the efficacy ofvoucher-
based incentives in reducing cocaine use, these investigators raised the ques-
tion ofwhether similar incentive programs might not be implemented in some
manner via use ofthe disability payments. Obviously, any such program would
need to be designed with great sensitivity to individual rights and could not
legally involve withholding entitlements. Those concerns notwithstanding, at
least two programs for the dually diagnosed are in the process of researching
such an approach (Shaner et al. 1995; Ries and Comtois 1997). To assess
whether substance use by schizophrenics is sensitive to economic factors, our
group recently completed a study in which schizophrenics recruited from a
local community mental health center were provided monetary incentives for
abstaining from cigarette smoking (i.e., the opportunity cost for smoking was
increased) (Roll et al. 1998). Abstinence increased significantly during the in-
centive phase of the study, demonstrating the sensitivity of substance use by
schizophrenics to opportunity cost.
6.5 Conclusions
Behavioral economics appears capable ofsubsuming and organizing empir-
ical observations regarding cocaine use that range from preclinical studies
conducted with laboratory animals to epidemiological studies conducted with
national samples. Such conceptual breadth is uncommon in the area of drug
abuse, anditsuggeststhatbehavioraleconomicsincorporatesconceptsandprin-
ciples that are fundamental to the initiation and maintenance of cocaine use
and abuse. There is also a great deal ofpotential heuristic value in the concep-
tual breadth of behavioral economics as it affords cocaine researchers oper-
ating in distinctly different settings (lab, clinic, communities) an opportunity
to build upon each others' findings. As an investigator who operates mostly in
the clinical pharmacology laboratory and treatment clinic, for example, my
workhas benefited immensely from the research ofmy colleagues in the basic-172 Stephen T. Higgins
science laboratory and, more recently, from the efforts of those involved in
epidemiological research. The history of science is very clear regarding the
value ofsound theory.
In my opinion, behavioral economics offers more than theory; it also offers
very practical strategies for reducing cocaine use and abuse. To the limited
extent that those strategies have been investigated, they appear equally ormore
effective in reducing cocaine abuse than anything else that has been attempted.
That is not to say thatbehavioral economics offers any magic bullets for resolv-
ing the challenges presented by cocaine abuse. It does not. However, it does
offer scientifically based strategies for improving treatment and prevention ef-
forts that merit further programmatic evaluation. Moreover, many ofthe strate-
gies suggested by behavioral economics are unconventional in terms ofcom-
mon practices in substance abuse treatment and prevention, which is good.
Variety should only be helpful as we attempt to identify and develop more ef-
fective interventions. Lastly, behavioral economics offers potential strategies
for reducing cocaine use and abuse beyond the formal substance abuse clinic.
There is a tremendous need for a broader-based approach to reducing cocaine
abuse, which is true for other types of substance abuse as well (e.g., Institute
ofMedicine 1990). Behavioral economics appears to have the potential to con-
tribute in important and novel ways to those broader efforts.
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Comment on Chapters 5 and 6 Jonathan P. Caulkins
BothChaloupka, Grossman, and Tauras's paper "TheDemand for Cocaine and
Marijuana by Youth" and Stephen Higgins's ''Applying Behavioral Economics
to the Challenge ofReducing Cocaine Abuse" address the fundamentally im-
portant topic ofhow substance use and users respond to incentives. Neverthe-
less, they are quite distinct in their approach and contribution, so I will discuss
them sequentially.
Chaloupkaet al. examine how responsive demand by u.S. youth for cocaine
and marijuana has been to changing circumstances. Their principal contribu-
tion is to extend the growing empirical literature on the price elasticity ofde-
mand for cocaine. Roughly 70 percentofthe $40billion orso the United States
spends annually on drug control is devoted to supply control measures (Office
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of National Drug Control Policy) [ONDCP] 1993). For mass-market drugs
such as cocaine, marijuana, and heroin, such enforcement has not been able
eitherto "sealthe borders" orto make drugs physically unavailable. Besides in-
creasing "search time" or the nondollar costs ofacquiring drugs, the principal
effect of these billions of dollars in enforcement spending is to keep prices
high. Semiprocessed agricultural products that need not, if they were legal,
cost much more than tea or coffee are, instead, worth many times their weight
in gold when sold on the streets ofcities such as Boston (Caulkins and Reuter
1998). Whether such enforcement has much effect on drug use, therefore, de-
pends directly and heavily on the elasticity of demand. Indeed, the elasticity
of demand is perhaps the single most important parameter for evaluating the
efficacy of U.S. drug control policy. This new estimate is of great value and
makes the paper one worth reading.
The paper, in addition, stimulates four observations. The first concerns the
paper's estimates ofhow various legal sanctions affect drug use. The variables
measuring the stringency ofenforcement consider only the statutory sentence
given conviction, which is very different than the quantity of greatest inter-
est-namely, the expected amount of enforcement or punishment suffered
given participation in the activity in question. There can be great disparities
between the actual average sanction and the statutory sanction. More impor-
tant, the analysis does not include any measure of the number of people con-
victed, let alone the number of people convicted per person selling or using
drugs.
Furthermore, we know there are instances when changes in the stringency
oflaws have been at least partially offset by changes in the number ofpeople
arrested and in charging practices. For instance, when certainAustralian states
introduced the expiation system, a sort of marijuana decriminalization, the
number ofarrests rose substantially. The usual interpretation is that the police
had been reluctant to make low-level marijuana arrests under the old system.
Even more surprising, the number offelony convictions for marijuana offenses
did not drop because many of those charged did not avail themselves of the
opportunity to pay the fine and expiate their sentence.
Finally, inasmuch as supplier sanctions reduce use by driving up price, and
as price is included in the cocaine regression, one would not expect the coeffi-
cientfor suppliersanction to capture sanctions' full contribution to suppressing
cocaine use.
The authors acknowledge these issues, but proceed to ignore them when it
comes time to draw conclusions; for example, "In general, higher sanctions for
the sale of either drug were not found to reduce use of that drug by youths"
(section 5.5). I think the variables measuring statutory sanction severity should
be includedin the regression. As controls, howeverimperfect, they presumably
improve the estimates of the price elasticity of demand. However, I do not
think the small magnitude ofthe coefficients ofthese variables should be con-176 Comment on Chapters 5 and 6
strued as particularly strong evidence ofthe inability ofenforcement sanctions
to influence use.
My second observation stems from the cross-sectional nature of the data
analysis. Drug prices are consistentwith a model ofthe domestic drug distribu-
tion network as following an urban hierarchy. In particular, prices appear to be
systematically lower in larger cities than in smaller cities, and lower in areas
surrounding larger cities than in areas surrounding smaller cities (Caulkins
1995). If there are factors associated with large cities that promote use apart
from these lower prices, then this cross-sectional analysis may overestimate
the price elasticity ofdemand. One obvious potential factor would be the possi-
bility that nondollar costs ofpurchasing and using drugs ("search times") are
lower in cities with larger markets.
A third observation is that although prices influence youth drug use, other
factors apparently play an even greater role. Between 1982 and 1989 cocaine
prices fell by about 75 percent (Caulkins 1994). Given Chaloupka et al.'s esti-
mate that the price elasticity ofcocaine participation is about -0.95, one might
have expected the prevalence ofcocaine use by youth to have increased by 70
to 75 percent. Instead, it fell by about 45 percent (Johnston, O'Malley, and
Bachman 1994). These numbers in no way contradict Chaloupka et al.'s elas-
ticity findings. Presumably, ifprices had not declined, prevalence rates would
have fallen even more dramatically. However, apparently factors other than
price overwhelmed the effect ofeven a dramatic decline in price.
The fourth observation concerns what inferences can be drawn about how
legalization would affect drug use, which Chaloupka et al. mention as a moti-
vation for this work. Theirconclusionthat "substantialreductions inillicit drug
prices that would almost certainly result from partial or full drug legalization
would lead to significant increases in the number of youths consuming illicit
drugs" (section 5.5) seems well supported by this work. Itis interesting to note,
though, how difficult it would be to produce bounds that are much tighter or
more specific. Even a completely accurate, highly precise estimate ofthe price
elasticity of demand derived from recent experience would not allow one to
predict very accurately by how much drug use would increase if drugs were
legalized. One reason is the one just mentioned: Nonprice factors also affect
drug use. A second is that the change in consumption one would predict from
legalization-induced declines in price depends at least as much on one's model
ofthe shape ofthe demand curve for prices between the current and postlegal-
ization price as it does on the elasticity or slope ofthe demand curve near the
current price.
Suppose for the sake ofargument that the currentprice and consumption are
$125 perpure gram and 291 pure metric tons ofcocaine, respectively. Suppose
further that legalization would reduce the price to $2.50 per gram and that the
elasticity ofdemand estimatedhere for youth, about -1.3, was apointestimate
at the current price and that it applied to all users. Then, if one thought the
demand curve were linear, this 98 percent decline in price would lead to a 1.3177 Comment on Chapters 5 and 6
x 0.98 = 127 percent increase in consumption.! In contrast, if one believed
the demand curve had constant elasticity (Q = uPTl), the 98 percent decline in
price would lead to a (0.02)-1.3 = 16,000 percent increase in consumption (to
47,000 metric tons). I doubt the latter model is correct. Among other reasons,
evidence was presented in other papers at this conference (Carroll, chap. 11 in
this volume) suggesting that the elasticity ofdemand might be lower at lower
prices. It illustrates clearly, however, that assumptions about the shape or na-
ture of the demand curve have as much impact on numeric estimates of the
legalization-induced consumption changes as do estimates of the elasticity
around current prices. Estimating elasticities of demand from recent data is
enormously valuable for analyzing drug policy reforms within a prohibitionist
framework that keeps prices moderately close to their current levels. Likewise,
it can provide a caution to the most Pollyanna-ish of legalization advocates
who would like to think legalization would not affect use much at all. Itcannot,
however, provide tight bounds on the likely consumption increase associated
with a hypothetical legalization ofcocaine.
Higgins's paper, in contrast, reviews clinical and laboratory evidence that sup-
ports the notion that cocaine use is an operant behavior that can fruitfully be
understood in terms ofconsumer-demand theory. The theoretical contribution
ofthis paper is its support for taking a behavioral economics approach to un-
derstanding drug abuse. Its practical contribution stems from the mechanisms
it suggests for controlling substance abuse. For example, interventions based
on contingency management have great promise, particularly given that, as
Mark Kleiman (1997) points out, (i) the majority of the cocaine and heroin
consumed in the United States is used by individuals who are under criminal
justice system "supervision," and (ii) such individuals are prime targets for
contingency-management interventions.
There seems to me little question about the validity ofthe experimental re-
sults Higgins describes. Many involve classical experimental design with con-
trols, random assignment, and so forth. Indeed, it is a joy for someone accus-
tomed to the social science literature to read such work. There is a delightful
rigor that traditional social science rarely, if ever, achieves. The key question
is the extent to which the results can be generalized beyond the laboratory or
clinical setting. I do not know the answer, but I can offer a few comments.
Thinking about laboratory results can suggest plausible drug control inter-
ventions, and Higgins lists several. It cannot, however, determine which of
1. The elasticity estimate of -1.3 was produced from years in which prices were generally at
least as high as the current price. Hence, I take it as a point estimate at the current price, not as an
arc elasticity that would apply over the price change considered in this example. Indeed, ifit were
viewed as an arc elasticity between the past (higher) price and the current price, the estimated
increase in consumption would be smaller. That would increase the difference between the pre-
dictors with the two demand models, reinforcing the overall point that uncertainty about the de-
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these plausible interventions will prove cost effective in practice. Higgins men-
tions both alternatives-based drug prevention and coerced-abstinence inter-
ventions for drug-involved offenders as programs that are consistent with the
concepts ofconsumer-demand theory that have been demonstrated in the labo-
ratory. Given what we know about conventional treatment's cost efficacy (Ry-
dell and Everingham 1994; Gerstein et al. 1994), I suspect that coerced ab-
stinence will prove cost effective. In contrast, in a recent review of the drug
prevention literature, I found no well-designed, controlled studies of alterna-
tives-based prevention interventions that proved costeffective, and the consen-
sus in the prevention literature favors so-called "psychosocial" or"comprehen-
sive" prevention interventions (Institute ofMedicine 1996).
Even if laboratory studies cannot prove the cost effectiveness of interven-
tions, they might stimulate ideas for interventions that would not have other-
wise been considered. That is certainly a possibility. However, although the
interventions Higgins describes might fairly be termed as innovative or pro-
gressive relative to the state of the art, the ideas are not entirely novel. They
have been proposed in the literature before. (See, e.g., the programs reviewed
in Caulkins et ale 1994.)
Paradoxically, when Higgins could present clinical data relevant to evalu-
ating the cost effectiveness of an intervention, he does not do so. The paper
stresses the statistical significance of results, not their magnitude or practical
significance. For example, Higgins cites a contingency management study for
which "32 percent ofcontingent patients achieved sustained periods ofabsti-
nence" averaging 9.4 weeks in length "compared to less than 10 percent in the
noncontingent condition" over the course of what I understand to be a six-
month study. There seems to be no question as to the statistical significance of
the difference in outcomes, but it sounds like contingency management was
able to reduce drug use by only a modest proportion. Suppose the individuals
whose longest period of abstinence was 9.4 weeks, on average, actually ab-
stained for an average of 18 weeks in total over the six months. Table 6C.l
suggests that contingency management reduced drug use during the trial by
about one-sixth, a nontrivial but not overwhelming reduction.
My interpretation of those numbers may be way off base, but if so, it just
underscores my larger point that it would have been useful if the article had
devoted more time to reporting the absolute magnitude ofthese effects. Like-
wise, although this intervention may be highly cost effective because it
achieved the reduction in use at very low cost, one cannot know that from the
article because no cost information is reported.
My final comment concerns just what marriage ofdisciplines is being con-
templated. One of Higgins's principal conclusions is that the application of
consumer-demand theory to understanding cocaine abuse is an important ad-
vance. That may well be true, but it is interesting that in this article the only
concepts borrowed from consumer-demand theory are demand (interpreted as
use), price, opportunity cost, and the existence ofsubstitutes and complements
(section 6.1). Those concepts are hardly unique to economics. Many fields that179 Comment on Chapters 5 and 6
Table 6C.l Hypothetical Illustration ofMagnitude ofEffect of Contingency-
Management Intervention
Noncontingent Contingent
Used for almost all of26 weeks (%)
Abstained for average of 18 of26 weeks (%)







systematically study decision making have parallel concepts, perhaps masquer-
ading under a different name. So inasmuch as Higgins is enthusiastic about the
potential benefit to clinicians and substance abuse professionals ofborrowing
ideas from different fields, perhaps the relevant field is not so much economics
as decision theory or choice modeling more generally.
It is also interesting to think about this marriage of fields from the other
side. What do economists and policy analysts gain from these rigorous labora-
tory and clinical studies? It depends on how full one perceives the glass ofex-
perimental results to be. A minimalist would say that the studies Higgins de-
scribes have demonstrated that consumption responds to prices, that income
affects consumption, and that there exist substances or objects that can serve
as either substitutes or complements for drugs. In short, drug users and drug
use respond to incentives. None ofthat is new. Policy analysts are quite famil-
iar with these concepts and have applied them to drug policy analysis. Further-
more, from personal experience, I have not had a great deal of trouble ex-
plaining to lay people why drug users should exhibit these behaviors, so the
ability to point to laboratory studies demonstrating these behaviors may be
helpful but certainly is not invaluable.
Imagine, for a minute, the opposite extreme. Imagine that many additional
years of laboratory studies have been pursued and have found evidence of
comparable credibility that laboratory animals and clinical subjects fit the
consumer-demand model entirely, in the sense that they can be described as
rationally maximizing a utility or preference function. Would that be very use-
ful? Not terribly. Analysts and researchers have long been quite willing to
apply such rational-actor models to drug use. Experimental confirmation of
these prior assumptions ofrationality might vindicate certain disciplinary prej-
udices, but it would not likely generate many new ideas.
Now imagine an intermediate scenario in which laboratory studies validate
models ofdrug use behavior that are more specific than merely "users respond
to incentives" but also more subtle than "users optimally maximize their utility
functions." Such results could be very useful to anyone trying to develop mod-
els ofhow drug users behave or trying to predict how drug users will respond
to various policy interventions.
Perhaps the best example of such an intermediate result discussed at this
conference is the idea that future events are discounted hyperbolically, not ex-
ponentially (Vuchinich and Simpson, chap. 4 in this volume). That finding
does not follow trivially from the notion that drug users respond to incentives.180 Comment on Chapters 5 and 6
Noris itconsistent with rational-actormodels. It helps explainobserved behav-
iors ofdrug users, such as impulsiveness and apparently inconsistent discount
rates (Kleiman 1992). It may also prove useful for designing interventions, for
example, because of what it says about the importance of immediacy of re-
wards in a contingency-management or coerced-abstinence program.
Unfortunately at present it does not seem that there are many such interme-
diate results from the laboratory studies. However, I am quite optimistic that
more will be forthcoming.
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Comment on Chapters 5 and 6 David Shurtleff
Chaloupka et al. provide an econometric analysis ofthe impact ofdrug prices
and drug control policies on youth drug abuse. Econometric approaches are ap-
pealing because they provide us with important real-world information about
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the relationships between economic fluctuations and the consumption ofcom-
modities (i.e., goods). In order to describe these relationships (demand func-
tions), econometric approaches factor in variables such as uncontrollable price
changes, consumed quantities, and other outside forces such as the availability
ofalternative substitutable commodities and income effects. While Chaloupka
et al.'s approach is based on existing data sets, possible relationships among
variables can provide important insights for latermanipulation and study under
controlled conditions.
The authors have made an impressive effort in coordinating data from vari-
ous data sets, such as Monitoring the Future; STRIDE (System to Retrieve In-
formation from Drug Evidence); and monetary fines and prison terms for the
sale, manufacture, and distribution ofcocaine and marijuana. From these data
sets they have constructed measures that do not determine actual amounts con-
sumed but that are useful in estimating demand elasticities for cocaine and
marijuana. Their conclusions are compelling, and suggest that among youth,
cocaine demand is inversely related to price. Furthermore, the data suggest that
increasing the penalties for the possession of cocaine and marijuana would
significantly reduce use, but such increases would need to be large to have a
significant impact. Also, youth demand for licit and illicit drugs is more sensi-
tive to price than adult demand. Research will be needed to determine why
such differences exist and to identify the economic or other variables that un-
derlie them. With regard to the effect ofprice manipulation on illicit drug con-
sumption, research from behavioral economics suggests that the "total price"
ofa commodity may include many and diverse behavioral elements such as the
amount ofeffort or force needed to make a response, the number ofresponses
required per unit ofcommodity, or the amount oftime needed to obtain a com-
modity. Such elements have not only been shown in the laboratory to be impor-
tant determinants ofthe total price ofcommodities (e.g., Hursh et al. 1988) but
may also be operating in the "natural world." For example, enforced drug-free
school and neighborhood "watch" zones may increase the total price ofillicit
drugs by increasing the effort and travel time needed to obtain them. By identi-
fying the various components of total price and their relative contribution to
total price, more effective drug prevention strategies and drug policies can then
be developed.
Dr. Higgins's paperprovides an excellent overview ofthe application ofeco-
nomic theory to the treatment ofdrug abuse by highlighting the usefulness of
contingency management as a treatment approach within a context of eco-
nomic concepts. Higgins describes how the conceptofopportunity cost (forfei-
ture of alternative commodities for using an illicit drug) and price can guide
the development of drug treatment strategies. He supports this claim by de-
scribing a study in which cocaine-dependent subjects were given vouchers for
clean urine (Higgins et al. 1995): ''Approximately twofold longer durations of
continuous cocaine abstinence were documented in the incentive group during
the 24-week treatment period than in the no-treatment group....Additionally,182 Comment on Chapters 5 and 6
those assigned to the incentive group evidenced greater reductions in the Ad-
diction Severity Index (ASI) Composite Drug Scale one year after treatment
entry (nine months after cessation ofvouchers) compared to those assigned to
the no-incentive group...." (section 6.3). This experiment demonstrates both
the short- and long-term efficacy ofcontingency management in reducing co-
caine abuse after cessation. Additional research needs to compare contingency
management with pharmacotherapy to determine their relative long-lasting ef-
fects in reducing drug abuse. Importantly, the paper by Higgins identifies a
variety ofcontingency-managementtechniques for treating drug abuse and ad-
diction. Typically, addicts are provided with alternatives that are both reinforc-
ing and that substitute for drug-related behaviors. In some cases, access to
alternative reinforcers or behaviors (such as vouchers and vocational training)
is dependent on drug abstinence. Higgins explains that these methods can and
should be applied to situations beyond laboratory and treatment settings. That
such alternative-choice approaches may be useful as prevention strategies in
neighborhoods with a high prevalence of illicit drug abuse, in the criminal
justice system, and in conjunction with social entitlement programs seems a
reasonable extension of the treatment- and laboratory-based research. Strate-
gies for testing and evaluating these interventions will be needed to assess their
efficacy in families, schools, and community settings.
Contingency management is designed explicitly to treat one of the seven
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association 1994) symptoms for drug depen-
dence; that is, cessation or reduction in important social, occupational, or
recreational activities because of substance use. Contingency management
attempts to restore these activities with the use of economic and behavior-
analysis principles. From an economic perspective, contingency management
increases the proportion of an individual's income through the receipt of
vouchers that are exchangeable for commodities and services, and through in-
creased savings from not purchasing drugs. Increased income, it is thought,
increases an individual's choices. If an individual's income is not sufficiently
increased-for example, because of low voucher values or insignificant in-
creases in income from foregoing drug purchases-contingency management
may fail. In addition, the economic concept ofsubstitution plays a role in de-
termining the success ofcontingency management. Ifearned activities are sub-
stitutablefor drug-relatedbehaviors, contingencymanagementshoulddecrease
the likelihood ofdrug use. Thus, the availability ofsubstitutable alternatives to
drug use and the proportional or marginal increase in income are at least two
important variables that will determine the success of contingency manage-
ment in treating drug dependence.
An important economic concept that emerges from both the Chaloupka et
al. and the Higgins papers is that elasticity ofdemand may determine changes
in drug use. Elasticity ofdemand is a concept that indicates the degree ofre-
sponsiveness ofthe commodity demanded to changes in its price. Ifdemand is
inelastic, a large percentage increase in price will produce a smallerpercentage183 Comment on Chapters 5 and 6
decrease in consumption. Conversely, demand is characterized as elastic if a
percentage increase in price leads to a larger percentage decrease in consump-
tion. Unitary elasticity refers to the condition in which a percentage increase in
price results in an equivalent percentage decrease in consumption. Dr. Higgins
describes an animal study from Nader and Woolverton (1992) showing that
rhesus monkeys, given the opportunity to self-administer cocaine, initially
show inelastic demand at low prices (Le., few responses per unit dose) but will
show greater elastic demand as the price for cocaine continues to increase.
Also, Bickel et al. (1990) have shown similar demand functions in a review of
laboratory studies across a variety of animal subjects and drugs of abuse.
Among youth, Chaloupka, et al. demonstrated that demand elasticity for co-
caine increases with price. It is clear from both these papers, and from much
ofthe extant behavioral and economic literature, thatillicit drug use is sensitive
to price manipulations in much the same way as more conventional commodi-
ties such as food (Hursh 1984; Hursh et al. 1988), and consumption of licit
drugs such as nicotine (Bickel et al. 1991) and alcohol (Babor et al. 1978; Big-
elow and Liebson 1972) in laboratory settings. This research further suggests
that studying demand for more conventional commodities could contribute to
the development ofbehavioral economic principles and concepts applicable to
drug abuse and addiction. Demand curve analysis can be used in a variety of
settings in which drug dependence will need to be evaluated. For example,
demand curve analysis has been recently used to compare abuse potential
across drug classes (Hursh and Winger 1995). Also, demand curve analysis can
be used to characterize the degree ofdependence in individual drug users. Such
information could be used to tailor a contingency-management treatment ap-
proach based on an individual's demand elasticity. That is, those individuals
who are highly dependent on a particular drug may demonstrate inelastic de-
mand compared with recreational users. By using this approach in the assess-
ment ofdrug dependence, along with other existing diagnostic tools (e.g., Ad-
diction Severity Index; McLellan et al. 1985), one could then determine the
severity ofthe addiction in order to develop more targeted drug treatment reg-
imens.
In conclusion, both papers contribute significantly to our understanding of
both licit and illicit drug abuse and addiction by showing the application of
behavioral and economic approaches to this public health problem. As econo-
mists and behavior analysts continue to collaborate, the potential for improved
interventions for drug prevention and treatment will grow. From a broader per-
spective, this conference has shown that drug abuse and the demand for drugs
can, in part, be explained within a behavioral economic framework. These pa-
pers effectively show how illicit drug use, in terms ofthe principle ofdemand
elasticity, is not different from more conventional commodities, and certainly
is not different from demand for licit drugs such as alcohol and nicotine (to-
bacco). Improved and refined data collection and development ofdata sets ex-
plicitly designed for the economic analysis ofdrug abuse will provide further184 Comment on Chapters 5 and 6
impetus to the search for environmental and economic factors responsible for
drug abuse, thus informing the debate on national drug policy, drug treatment
strategies, and prevention.
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